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   1 
Abstract 
 
The experiential sampling method (ESM) was used to collect data from 74 part-
time students who described and assessed the risks involved in their current activities 
when  interrupted  at  random  moments  by  text  messages.    The  major  categories  of 
perceived risk were short-term in nature and involved “loss of time or materials” related 
to work and “physical damage” (e.g., from transportation). Using techniques of multi-
level analysis, we demonstrate effects of gender, emotional state, and types of risk on 
assessments of risk.  Specifically, females do not differ from males in assessing the 
potential severity of risks but they see these as more likely to occur. Also, participants 
assessed risks to be lower when in more positive self-reported emotional states. We 
further demonstrate the potential of ESM by showing that risk assessments associated 
with  current  actions  exceed  those  made  retrospectively.  We  conclude  by  noting 
advantages and disadvantages of ESM for collecting data about risk perceptions.    
 
 
Keywords:    Experiential  sampling  method;  risk  perception;  risk  assessment;  gender 
differences; multi-level analysis; simultaneous vs. retrospective judgment. 
     2 
Risk  perception,  and  the  role  of  risk  in  decision  making,  has  received 
considerable attention in both theoretical and applied work over the last five decades 
(see,  e.g.,  Fischhoff,  Bostrom,  &  Quadrell,  2002;  Sjöberg,  2000;  Slovic,  2000).  
Empirically, four major methodologies can be distinguished.  In one, researchers use 
surveys  (questionnaires)  to  elicit  people’s attitudes  toward  specified  risks  (see, e.g., 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979). The second is the use of choices between 
experimental gambles (see, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  In the third, people are 
asked  to  state  how  much  they  are  willing  to  pay  to  avoid  certain  risks  (see,  e.g., 
Hammitt & Graham, 1999). And in the fourth, researchers infer people’s attitudes to 
risk  by  observing  their  choices  in  specific  situations,  e.g.,  the  decision  to  smoke 
(Viscusi, 1992) or to drive without using seat-belts (Richens, Imrie, & Copas, 2000).
1 
One conclusion from these studies is that risk – and the perception of risk – is 
not easily characterized. It is unclear, for example, what people understand by the term 
“risk” and assessments are subject to many individual and situational factors.  In this 
paper, we ask a question that is not addressed by the methodologies enumerated above, 
namely: What risks do people perceive and assess in their daily activities?
2  However, 
answering this question has two requisites.  One is that people should define the risks 
they encounter.  The second is to ensure that these risks are representative of their daily 
activities. 
The  methodology  we  employ  is  inspired  by  Brunswik’s  concept  of 
representative design (Brunswik, 1956) and is aimed at sampling people’s behaviors (in 
our  case  perceptions of  risk) as they go  about  their daily lives.   In an early study, 
Brunswik (1944) illustrated the method by investigating a person’s ability to estimate 
distances  and  the  sizes  of  objects  in  her  natural  environment  (the  University  of 
                                                
1 This kind of analysis has also been done at the societal level (see, e.g., Tengs & Graham, 1996). 
2 We are not, of course, the first investigators to ask this question. See, e.g., Fischer et al. (1991).   3 
California  at  Berkeley).    Over  a  period  of  four  weeks,  the  person  (a  student)  was 
followed by a researcher and instructed to behave in her normal fashion.  However, at 
irregular – or random moments – the participant was asked to estimate the sizes of 
objects that happened to be in her visual field as well as the distances from the objects.  
The researcher then checked the accuracy of the estimates.  It is important to note that 
the researcher did not choose the specific “experimental tasks” (i.e., the objects in the 
participant’s visual field), but instead defined a process by which these were a random 
sample of the participant’s experience.  Thus, although the study was conducted with a 
single  participant,  the  random  sampling  process  used  was  sufficient  to  make 
generalizable statements about this person’s ability to judge sizes and distances.  
In  1944,  Brunswik’s  methodology  clearly  required  much  labor  to  make 
inferences about a single person. However, recent years have seen the growth of what is 
now referred to as the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) using modern technology 
(e.g., beepers, palmtop computers) to prompt participants to respond to questionnaires at 
random moments (see, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hurlburt, 1997; Bolger, 
Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). For example, in a recent study using cell telephones, Hogarth 
(2006) sampled the decision making behaviors of undergraduate students and business 
executives. Specifically, the goal was to investigate how much feedback people receive 
and/or  expect  to  receive  on  the  many  decisions  they  make  each  day.  By  sampling 
individual participants up to four times a day for up to two weeks, random samples of 
the  participants’  decisions  were  obtained  such  that  estimates  could  be  made  of  the 
feedback they received or expected to receive. This, in turn, allowed inferences to be 
made  about  the  characteristics  of  decision  making  tasks  that  people  face  in  their 
everyday lives.  Incidentally, although not a major study, some 1,200 data points (i.e.,   4 
decisions)  were  obtained  from  34  participants  such  that  good  estimates  could  be 
obtained at both individual and group levels. 
It  is  important  to  emphasize  the  kinds  of inferences  that  can  and cannot  be 
drawn from ESM studies. At the individual level, the method can be used to make 
inferences about a single person’s behavior (e.g., judgments and/or situations faced). 
That  is,  the  population  of  behavior  to  which  one  can  generalize  is  limited  to  the 
particular individual.  However, the extent to which the individual is representative of a 
specific population depends on how the individual was sampled from that population. In 
many cases, individuals belong to so-called “convenience samples” (i.e., participants 
who  could  be  recruited  for  studies)  and  thus  are  not  necessarily  representative  of 
specific  populations.    Nonetheless,  one  can  still  aggregate  individual  responses  and 
make inferences at the group level albeit without claims for generalization.   
   In the study reported here, 74 part-time students answered questions about the 
risks  they  perceived  themselves  facing  when  they  received  text  messages  from  the 
investigators.  The participants each received three such messages at random moments 
during 10 consecutive working days.  The main goal of the study was to understand 
better the kinds of risk that people experience in their daily lives. However, we were 
also intrigued by other questions:  Do emotional state and gender moderate assessments, 
and how?  Can overall judgments of risk be decomposed into judgments of the severity 
of  the  negative  consequences,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  possibility  of  such  events 
occurring, on the other hand? Do simultaneous risk assessments (i.e., made at the time 
the risk is experienced) differ from retrospective judgments (i.e., when recalled after the 
event)? 
In the next section of this paper, we describe our methodology. This is followed 
by presenting the results. In short, participants’ perceptions of risks are mainly short-  5 
term and concrete. At the same time, they assess surprisingly high estimates of the 
possibility that the worst consequences of their current actions will be realized.  We find 
that females provide, on average, higher assessments of risks than males. However, 
there is no difference in assessments of potential severity of risks.  Rather, females 
judge  that  negative  consequences  are  more  likely  to  occur.  When  self-reported 
emotional states are better, assessments of risks and their likelihood of occurrence are 
lower.  We  explore  possible  differences  between  simultaneous  and  retrospective 
estimates of risk and find that the former exceed the latter. We conclude by discussing 
advantages and disadvantages of using ESM to illuminate issues of risk perception.    
  
Method 
Participants. Seventy-four students (46 women and 28 men) were recruited from 
the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. They ranged in age between 18 and 56 (median 
22). A condition of their participation was that they had part-time jobs (defined by at 
least half of full working days). They were paid 30 € for their participation that, in 
addition to responding to the questions detailed below, required attendance at sessions 
before and after the experiment for instructions and debriefing.    
Procedures. We sent text messages to participants between 8 am and 10 pm over 
a  two-week  period  that  excluded  week-ends,  i.e.,  for  10  days.  Depending  on  their 
working hours, some participants received their messages between 8 am and 3 pm and 
the  others  between  3  pm  and  10  pm  (31  and  43  participants,  respectively).
3    To 
determine when messages should be sent, we divided time into segments of 15 minutes 
and chose six segments at random each day (three for each group of participants).   
                                                
3 The objective was to send participants messages during the part of the day in which they were mainly at 
work.   6 
When they received a message, participants were required to note the date and 
time  and  to  answer  eight  questions.
4  Two  of  these  questions  were  open-ended;  the 
others required responses on scales. The questions, their scales, and the abbreviations 
we use, were: 
1.  How would you evaluate your emotional state right now? Scale from 1(very 
negative) to 10 (very positive): emotional state. 
2.  What are you doing right now?  Open-ended and subsequently referred to as 
ACT: activity. 
3.  Is ACT professional or personal in nature?  Binary response: type. 
4.  How  often  do  you  do  ACT?  Scale  from  1  (first  time)  to  10  (many  times): 
frequency.  
5.  What is the WORST consequence that could result from ACT?  Open-ended: 
worst consequence. 
6.  How do you rate the severity of the WORST consequence that could result from 
ACT? Scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high): severity. 
7.  At  this  moment,  what  is  the  chance  that  the  WORST  consequence  of  ACT 
occurs? Scale from 0 (impossible) to 100 (certain): possibility. 
8.  At this moment, what risk for your well-being do you associate with ACT? Scale 
from 0 (very low) to 100 (very high): risk. 
After completing the task, participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid in a 
session in which they also completed some questionnaires including one in which they 
re-assessed the risks associated with two activities they had reported in the preceding 
weeks. 
 
                                                
4 All questions were asked in Spanish.   7 
Results 
   Response  rates.    Overall,  we  sent  out  2,220  messages  (=  3  x  10  x  74)  and 
received 2,213 responses (99.7%).
5 For various reasons, people might not receive text 
messages  when  they  are  sent  (e.g.,  cell  telephones  may  have  been  turned  off). We 
therefore checked the extent to which messages were received when they were sent. 
Participants reported receiving messages between 0 and 22 minutes after they were sent 
with an overall mean (median) of 3 (2) minutes. We deem both response rates and 
reported times of receiving messages quite satisfactory. 
Overall trends. The goal of Table 1 is to provide an overview of the data. It is a 
cross-tabulation of activities (rows) by types of losses (columns) and was constructed 
from a content analysis of the two open-ended responses to the questionnaires.
6 To 
perform this analysis, definitions of the categories for activities and types of losses were 
first constructed. Then, two researchers independently allocated responses to categories. 
Disagreements between the two coders were resolved by having them discuss until they 
reached consensus.    In Appendix A, we provide definitions of the categories used to 
classify activities and worst consequences as well as illustrative examples. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
  Overall,  the  74  participants  provided  information  about  2,213  activities  and 
types of loss. Two-thirds of all activities involved participants’ basic occupation (34%), 
personal  transportation  (11%),  eating  and  drinking  (10%),  and  entertainment  and 
recreation (10%).  Most types of loss can be categorized as loss of time or materials 
(42%) or physical damage (37%).  The largest single joint entry in the table (445) is for 
loss of time or materials associated with participants’ basic occupation.   This accounts 
                                                
5 We used commercially available software to dispatch the messages to the 74 participants. 
6 Here, as in other cases where qualitative responses were provided, we report the initial inter-coder 
agreement prior to the reaching of consensus.   8 
for 20% of all the data. Within the basic occupation category, loss of time or materials 
accounts for 59% of all potential losses and this is more than twice the next largest 
category,  physical  damage  (23%).    The  second  largest  joint  entry  is  for  potential 
physical damage arising from personal transportation (189 instances or 9% of the total). 
In  fact,  of  all  the  activities,  transportation  is  the  one  where  type  of  loss  is  most 
associated with physical damage. Moreover, it is of interest to note the effects of the 
goal of transportation (personal or professional).  Physical damage accounts for 79% of 
potential losses when transportation is personal, but 60% when this is professional. 
    Apart from transportation, the only other categories with a majority of losses 
associated with physical damage are the activities of eating and drinking and smoking.  
In  Appendix  B,  we  reproduce  some  of  the  responses  given  by  participants.  It  is 
immediate rather than longer-term damage that predominates. In the case of eating and 
drinking, 57% of losses involve “choking/suffocating,” 26% “indigestion,” and 18 % 
“burns, cuts, or other injuries associated with the act of eating or drinking.”  In the case 
of  smoking,  there  are  many  more  mentions  involving  immediate  and  minor 
consequences (64% for “to getting burned”) than to the more serious consequences that 
are  stressed  in  anti-smoking  advertisements  (36%  refer  to  cancer  or  respiratory 
problems).  Given the limited number of observations, however, these results should be 
viewed with caution. Nonetheless, we believe they are noteworthy because the data 
were collected at a time when sensitivity to the dangers of smoking has reached an all-
time high in Spain.  They are also generally representative of many of the potential 
losses cited by our respondents in that these are dominated by short-term consequences 
of risky activities.  We believe that these findings could be important in thinking about 
how the risks associated with different activities should be communicated.   9 
   Some 60% of all activities are perceived as being personal in nature. At the same 
time,  73%  of  participants  perceive  their  activities  as  being  more  personal  than 
professional.  We draw attention to these facts because the data were collected during   
times when most participants were working. (For similar results, see Mullet, Ciutad, & 
Rivière-Shafighi, 2004).  This suggests, therefore, that their occupations allowed much 
time  for  personally-initiated  activities,  a  result  that  was  also  observed  in  Hogarth’s 
(2006) ESM study of business executives and undergraduates. 
  Modeling the data using HLM.  The design of our study involved data that can 
be thought of as being collected at two levels.  One – termed level 1 – is represented by 
participants’ responses to the 30 occasions on which they received SMS messages (i.e., 
at the level of events).  The other – level 2 – is at that of the participants themselves 
(i.e., characteristics of the participants that do not change across the 30 events).  Thus, 
for example, it is of interest to know whether emotional state at the moment judgments 
are elicited affects assessments of risk (i.e., at level 1) and also whether such judgments 
reflect differences between the participants in, say, gender (i.e., at level 2).  As such, our 
data can be efficiently modeled using the techniques of hierarchical linear models (Bryk 
& Raudenbush, 2002; Goldstein, 1995; Longford, 1994).  
  In what follows, we first ask what variables (at both levels) explain responses for 
severity,  possibility,  and  risk  (treated  as  three  separate  dependent  variables).  We 
subsequently explore how best to model risk as a function of, inter alia, severity and 
possibility.  But, before presenting results, we motivate our use of the hierarchical linear 
model technique with an example.  
Assume we wish to model risk as being affected by emotional state (at level 1) 
but that this is moderated by gender (at level 2). 
Define the model at level 1 as   10 
ij j ij j j ij r X X Y + - + = ) ( . 1 0 b b            (1)      
where 
Yij is the judgment of risk on the i
th occasion (i = 1,…..,30) for the j
th individual  (j = 
1,…, 74); 
) ( . j ij X X -  is the deviation of the reported emotional state ij X  on the i
th occasion for the 
j
th individual from his or her average emotional state  j X. ; 
j 0 b  is the individual-specific intercept; 
j 1 b  is the individual-specific slope (regression coefficient) of  Yij  on  ) ( . j ij X X - ; and  
rij    is  the  error  term  which  we assume  normally  distributed  with  constant  variance, 
ij r ~N(0,s
2). 
Define the model at level 2 as 
b0 j = g 00  + g 01Zj + u0 j             (2) 
and 
b1j = g 10  + g 11Zj  +  u1j             (3)                                                                
where  
Zj = gender of participant (0, female, or 1, male); 
00 g  is the constant part of the intercept j 0 b ; 
01 g  is the regression coefficient of  j 0 b  on Zj ; 
u0j   is an error term (the individual effect on judgments of risk); 
10 g  is the constant part of the slope  j 1 b ; 
11 g  is the effect of gender on the slope  j 1 b  (i.e., the interaction of gender and emotional 
state on judgments of risk);   11 
 u1j    is an individual error term, that is, the random interaction effect of individual j and 
emotional state on judgments of risk.  
Thus, to interpret the above,  00 g   is the average risk score across all women, 
while  00 g + 01 g  is the average risk score across all men;  10 g  is the average effect across 
women of emotional state on judgments of risk, while  10 g + 11 g   represents the average 
effect across men of emotional state on judgments of risk. We assume that u0j and u1j   
are  random  variables  with  zero  means,  variances  00 t   and  11 t ,  respectively,  and 
covariance  01 t ;  they  represent  the  variability  in  j 0 b   and j 1 b   that  remains  after 
controlling for Zj . 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1), we obtain 
       ) - )( (    . 1 11 10 0 01 00 ij j ij j j j j ij r X X u Z u Z Y + + + + + + = g g g g        (4) 
which can be re-arranged as 
     ) ( ) - ( ) ( . 1 0 . 11 . 10 01 00 ij j ij j j j ij j j ij j ij r X X u u X X Z X X Z Y + - + + + - + + = g g g g  (5) 
Note  that,  in  the  latter  expression,  one  can  distinguish  the  fixed  part, 
    ) - ( ) ( . 11 . 10 01 00 j ij j j ij j X X Z X X Z g g g g + - + + (with main effect for Z, main effect for 
X  and  their  interaction),  from  the  random  part,       ) ( . 1 0 ij j ij j j r X X u u + - + (with 
individual  random  effect,  random  interaction  between  the  j
th  individual  and  X,  and 
occasion-specific error term). 
We have only illustrated the model by considering one independent variable at 
level 1 (emotional state) and one independent variable at level 2 (gender). However, it is 
straightforward  to  construct  more  complete  models  by  considering  vectors  of 
independent  variables  at  both  levels.    Moreover,  we  can  consider  variations  of  the 
models where coefficients associated with different independent variables are random or 
fixed.   12 
  Severity,  possibility,  and  risk.  The  main  results  of  modeling  judgments  of 
severity, possibility, and risk are provided in Table 2.
7  In estimating the models, we 
used the maximum likelihood method and the HLM6 software.
8  We first comment on 
variables included in the analyses.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Two  sets  of  variables  were  included  to  check  the  assumption  that  we  were 
sampling  events  randomly from  our participants.  At level  2,  we included  a dummy 
variable, “Moment of day,” to capture whether participants belonged to the morning or 
afternoon groups (see above).  At level 1, we also tested whether the position of the 
message  in  a  day  (i.e.,  first,  second,  or  third)  had  an  influence  on  responses.  This 
possible “Sequence” effect was captured by two dummy variables (“Second in day,” 
“Third in day”). 
Participants reported their emotional state on each occasion they received an 
SMS message. (This was the first of the eight questions they answered, see above.) We 
used these data in two ways. One was to calculate the mean of each person’s emotional 
states  to  estimate  overall  individual  tendencies  (i.e.,  at  level  2);  the  other  was  to 
calculate deviations from those means to capture responses to different situations (i.e., 
at level 1).   
  We used dummy variables to assess the effects of three types of “worst loss” 
relative to the category “none.” These were “Physical damage,” “Psychological/social 
conflict,”
9 and “Loss of time or materials.” In coding responses, we had noted that 
situations  in  which  risk  was  perceived  varied  as  to  whether  people  were  alone  or 
                                                
7  The  dependent  variables  possibility  and  risk  were  rescaled  from  0-100  to  0-10  to  maximize 
comparability across all three dependent variables.  
8  The student version of this can be downloaded free from the internet, see http://www.ssicentral.com  
9 This represented the combination of the categories “Psychological discomfort” and “Social conflicts” in 
Table 1.   13 
interacting  with  others.  We  therefore  also  classified  situations  as  to  whether  they 
involved “Interactions” and with whom – “Friends or family” or “Work.”  
Several conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. 
  First, the three models all have independent variables that are significant at level 
1; however, at level 2, the model for severity has no significant variables.   
  Second, neither “Moment of day” (level 2) nor the “Sequence” variables (level 
1) are significant in any of our models.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that we are dealing with random samples of the participants’ behavior. 
  Third, in all three models there is no significant effect for emotional state at level 
2 but this is significant at level 1 for both possibility and risk.  For these variables, being 
in a better mood implies making lower assessments. We emphasize that, in modeling 
emotional state at level 1, we tested and found that a random coefficient should be 
preferred  to  a fixed  coefficient.
10  In  other  words,  there  was  considerable  individual 
heterogeneity in the relation between mood state, on the one hand, and judgments of 
possibility and risk, on the other hand. 
  Fourth, gender effects (level 2) mediated judgments of possibility and risk but 
not severity (females assessed possibility and risk higher than males). 
  Fifth, there were no effects due to whether participants classified risks as being 
private  or  professional  in  nature  and  frequency  (i.e.,  how  often  particular  risks  are 
faced) had only a small, significant effect on severity. 
  Sixth, there were significant effects for types of risks.  The mean judgments for 
severity and risk are highest for “Physical damage” and lowest for “Loss of time or 
materials”  (excluding,  of  course,  the  category  “none”).    Interestingly,  the  negative 
                                                
10 The likelihood ratio test statistic for the comparison between the constrained model (fixed coefficient, 
meaning variance of the slope coefficient equal to 0) and the unconstrained model (random coefficient) is 
2
2df c = 12.5 (p-value = 0.002) for the dependent variable possibility and 
2
2df c  = 15.3 (p-value < 0.001) 
for the dependent variable risk.   14 
consequences associated with “Psychological/social conflict” are seen as being more 
likely (greater possibility) than the others.   
  Seventh, we note that assessments of possibility were, on average, quite high 
(e.g., the effect for physical damage was 2.57). Indeed, if one treats these assessments as     
probabilities, they suggest considerable overestimates (e.g., approximately one fourth of 
risks  of  physical  damage  clearly  did  not  occur  subsequent  to  when  the  risks  were 
perceived).  We discuss this result further below.    
  Before  discussing  the  implication  of  these  results,  we  consider  modeling 
judgments of risk as being affected by the prior judgments of severity and possibility. 
Modeling  judgments  of  risk.    How  do  judgments  of  severity  and  possibility 
contribute to assessed risk and what other variables explain risk when the contributions 
of severity and possibility have been taken into account? 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
In  Table  3,  we  present  the  results  of  four  hierarchical  linear  models  that 
progressively answer these questions.   Model 1 is a “null model” that decomposes the 
variance without any explanatory variable, capturing the overall mean and the variance 
both  between  and  within  individuals.
  11    Model  2  adds  the  independent  effects  of 
severity and possibility at level 1 (occasions). Here, the coefficients for both severity 
and possibility are significant and of the expected sign (i.e., larger assessments of risk 
are  associated  with  greater  severity  and  possibility).    Model  3  also  considers  the 
interaction  between  severity  and  possibility.  In  this  formulation,  severity  and  the 
interaction are significant but possibility is not.  In Model 4, we investigated variables 
                                                
11 The “null model” is the simplest hierarchical linear model and is equivalent to a one-way ANOVA with 
random effects. The estimation of the null model is a first step in a hierarchical analysis. It can be used to 
estimate the intraclass correlation coefficient (0.36 in Model 1) that measures the proportion of total 
variance corresponding to differences between level 2 units (individuals).      15 
that had further significant effects. These are gender at level 2 (men assess risk lower 
than women), emotional state at level 1 (the better the emotional state, the lower the 
assessment of risk), and positive effects for both risks involving physical damage and 
interactions with friends and family (also level 1).  
In short, our data are consistent with the idea that both severity and possibility 
contribute  to  assessments  of  risk  but  that  these  assessments  are  also  influenced  by 
gender, emotional state, and types of risk.  Indeed, given the importance of both gender 
and emotional state in our findings, we display the fitted effects of both these variables 
on assessments of risk in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Retrospective versus simultaneous judgments of risk. In the post-experimental 
questionnaire (completed between 2 and 7 days after participants had provided their last 
experimental responses), we showed participants two activities (i.e., ACTs) they had 
reported  over  the  two-week  period,  namely  for  the  4
th  and  27
th  messages  they  had 
received.
12  We then asked them to re-assess the levels of risk that were associated with 
each of these activities. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------   
Table 4 reports the mean risk judgments for the 4
th and 27
th messages made 
retrospectively  (i.e.,  after  the  experiment)  and  simultaneously  (i.e.,  during  the 
experiment  and  thus  when  experiencing  the  risk).    The  differences  (retrospective  – 
simultaneous) of -13.8 and -10.7 are both large and statistically significant (t = - 4.86, p 
                                                
12  These  meant,  of course,  that  the  types  of risk  sampled depended  entirely  on  the  activities  of  the 
individual participants.   16 
<.001; and t = -3.65, p <.001 for the 4
th and 27
th messages, respectively).
13   In other 
words, risks are judged to be higher at the time they are experienced than in hindsight. 
   
Discussion 
  We  discuss  our  results  by  considering  the  types  of  risks  identified  by  our 
participants; differences between simultaneous and retrospective assessments of risk; 
and individual differences in risk assessment.  In doing so, we enumerate advantages 
and disadvantages of using the ESM to study the perception and assessment of risk and 
also suggest avenues for further research. 
  The manner in which participants were asked to identify risks was by linking 
these explicitly to their current actions.  Such assessments have the advantage of being 
based in the participants’ reality. However, this can limit the types of risks reported.    
For example, imagine a worker who is using a potentially dangerous work tool but is 
pre-occupied by the risk of wasting valuable materials if a mistake is made.  Because 
the latter risk is salient when interrogated, it is likely to be reported even though the 
consequences of the dangers inherent in using the tool are greater.   Similarly (and as 
noted  above),  our  respondents  who  were  smoking  were  far  more  likely  to  mention 
short-term risks such as being burned by a cigarette rather than longer-term and more 
serious risks to health.  
  On  the  other  hand,  from  a  policy  perspective  of  risk  prevention  and 
communication, it is critical to understand the risks to which people are attending when 
involved in different activities, e.g., being burned by a cigarette as opposed to dying 
from lung cancer.   
                                                
13 These data can also be used to test for reliability in that the correlation between the 4
th (27
th) response 
assessed simultaneously and retrospectively was 0.45 (0.62), p < .01 for both.     17 
These considerations suggest that the risks that people consciously perceive are 
a subset of the risks that they actually face in their everyday lives. Thus, many of the 
risks that are commonly studied in surveys were totally absent from our participants’ 
responses.  For example, whereas 21 of our 74 participants were traveling by train or 
waiting  at  a  station  when  they  received  SMS  messages,  on  only  one  occasion  did 
anyone mention the risk of terrorism. And yet, one year prior to when the data were 
collected, many people were killed in an attack in Madrid while simply commuting to 
work.  In future work, it would be of interest to investigate explicitly the risks that 
people do not mention. 
A second, important finding was that assessments of risk made simultaneously 
(i.e., when responding to SMS messages) were greater than those made retrospectively 
(i.e., at the debriefing session after the study).  There are clearly differences between the 
two judgments.  One takes place in “the field” at the time when the risk is perceived; the 
other is assessed in laboratory conditions and involves memory.  In addition, we suspect 
that the former is more emotionally charged than the latter (cf., Epstein, 1994) such that 
the direction of the difference in assessed risk should not be too surprising. At the same 
time, the finding suggests that surveys of perceived risk (conducted in laboratory-like 
conditions) are likely to underestimate the levels of risk that people experience in their 
daily lives.  This issue clearly requires further research. 
A related issue concerns our observation that participants’ assessments of the 
“possibility” that they would suffer the worst consequences associated with their current 
actions seemed unrealistically high (roughly 30%). It is not clear to us, however, that 
the participants understood the possibility scale as a measure of probability and so we 
are cautious in how we interpret this result. At the same time, it does suggest another 
ESM study in which participants are provided with an explicit probability scale and/or   18 
verbal probabilistic statements and where, after the study, they report on how many of 
the worst consequences actually occurred.
14  More generally, it suggests that ESM could 
be  profitably  used  to  study  issues  of  calibration  in  the  assessment  of  subjective 
probabilities as well as possible hindsight biases (cf., Fischhoff, 1975). In this way one 
would  be  sampling  events  that  are  representative  of  the  participants’  lives  (cf., 
Brunswik,  1944)  in  a  much  more  satisfactory  manner  than  laboratory  studies  that 
attempt  to  achieve  the  same  goal  (Gigerenzer,  Hoffrage,  &  Kleinbölting,  1991; 
Klayman et al., 1999). 
The methodology of ESM clearly allows one to draw inferences at the individual 
level;  however,  it  presents  a  greater  challenge  in  finding  ways  to  represent  the 
aggregate-level data (cf., Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003).  In presenting Table 1, for 
example, we attempted to provide aggregate information but recognize that these fail to 
capture the richness of the data.  On the other hand, the hierarchical linear models we 
used provided a tidy manner of capturing systematic variance in the data at the levels of 
both individuals and occasions.   
Our findings on gender differences are consistent with many findings  in the 
literature that suggest that women perceive higher risks than men in relation to specific 
activities such as smoking and air travel (Slovic, 1992; Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994; 
Jungermann, Pfister, & Fischer, 1996) as well as in domains such as environmental and 
nuclear  power  risks  (Brun,  1994;  Greenberg  &  Schneider,  1995).    More  generally, 
Flynn et al. (1994) found that white women perceive risk to be higher than white men 
(in the US).
15 A recent  study by Harris, Jenkins, and Glaser (2006) presents results 
similar to our own in that the source of higher risk assessments for negative events by 
                                                
14  Of  course,  one  would  have  to  exclude  from  analysis  events  that  could  not  yet  have  taken  place. 
However, most risks on which participants report are short-term in nature. Thus, this should not unduly 
restrict the number of possible observations. 
15 See also the meta-analysis of gender differences by Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999).   19 
women is linked to larger assessments of probabilities as opposed to the severity of 
risks per se. 
A striking feature of our data was that, despite using only a simple self-reported 
measure of mood (emotional state), we obtained significant effects on judgments of 
both risk and possibility.  This finding therefore adds to the growing literature that 
attests to the importance of emotions in the assessment of risk (see, e.g., Loewenstein et 
al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002).  We emphasize four points. First, we found no overall 
mood  effect  at  the  level  of  individuals  (i.e.,  using  the  average  of each  individual’s 
emotional state judgments as a dispositional measure) but this was significant at the 
level of situations that individuals faced (i.e., level 1). In other words, the effect of 
emotional  state  in  our  data  appeared  to  reflect  the  situations  faced  as  opposed  to 
personal dispositions.
16  Second, the effect was better modeled by a random as opposed 
to fixed coefficient thereby attesting to considerable individual heterogeneity. Third, 
similar  to  the  result  concerning  gender,  emotional  state  would  appear  to  affect 
judgments of risk by impacting the imagined possibility of the occurrence of negative 
events as opposed to assessments of potential severity of losses. 
Fourth, given that we obtained these results using a simple self-report measure, 
it is intriguing to imagine what might be obtained using more sophisticated measuring 
devices.  Indeed, in a not too distant future, one might imagine that technology for ESM 
studies could also include physical monitoring devices capable of detecting galvanic 
skin responses and perhaps even neurological measures. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has used the ESM to 
study the perception and assessment of risk.  Like all other methodologies, it is not 
without its own problems. For example, there may be a bias in the particular risks that 
                                                
16 On the other hand, we note that some studies that did not use the ESM have reported effects of some 
personality variables on assessments of risk (Bouyer et al., 2001). 
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participants report although this, in itself, raises the interesting issue of identifying the 
risks  of  which  people  are  not  consciously  aware.    A  second  bias  may  be  that  the 
methodology (i.e., explicit questioning) directs participants’ attention to specific types 
of risks.  On the other hand, the methodology has the enormous advantage of being able 
to collect random samples of people’s perceptions of the risks they face in everyday life, 
and  –  as  demonstrated  in  this  study  –  the  ubiquity  of  cell  telephones  provides 
researchers  with  the  possibility  of  collecting  data  in  situ  at  relatively  modest  cost. 
Moreover, assessments associated with these perceptions probably differ from results 
collected through the more usual survey methods. This therefore raises ambiguities in 
interpreting results of more conventional studies of risk perception and questions what 
risk perception means when not elicited in the context of actually taking decisions. The 
methodology  used  also  means  that  the  perception  of  risk  can  be  described  at  both 
individual and aggregate levels.   
Finally, we are impressed by the potential of ESM for studying the perception 
and assessment of risk.  As any single methodology, it is clearly incomplete relative to 
the complexities of the means. However, it suggests novel ways of studying important 
issues  and  therefore  can  and  should  be  used  as  a  means  to  complement  other 
methodologies.   21 
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   Table 1: Activities by types of losses           
                   
  Type of loss
1:      Loss of time   Physical  Psychological  Social      
        or materials  damage  discomfort   conflicts  None  Other 
      %  42  37  12  5  4  0 
 Activity
2:  %  Total             
                   
 Basic occupation  34  751  445  171  57  58  20  0 
                    
 Transportation -- personal  11  240  38  189  11  0  2  0 
                     
 Eating and drinking  10  224  45  147  18  2  10  2 
                     
 Entertainment, recreation, sports  10  215  73  78  51  2  10  1 
                     
 Acquiring information  7  151  68  21  49  3  10  0 
                     
 Housework, personal time, and managing 
funds   
5  117  55  54  2  0  6  0 
                     
 Communication -- personal  5  112  41  14  15  36  6  0 
                     
 Personal care (e.g., hygiene, dressing)  5  102  38  40  21  1  2  0 
                     
 Rest, sleep  3  76  25  19  29  1  2  0 
                     
 Transportation -- professional  3  72  25  43  4  0  0  0 
                     
 Pauses at start/end of working day  3  68  30  20  6  5  6  1 
                     
 Shopping  1  30  20  3  3  0  4  0 
                     
 Waiting  1  29  24  4  1  0  0  0 
                     
 Smoking  1  15  2  11  0  2  0  0 
                     
 Other  0  11  4  5  2  0  0  0 
  Total     2,213  933  819  269  110  78  4 
                   
                   
  
1Initial inter-coder agreement. Kappa= 0.65                 
  
2Initial inter-coder agreement. Kappa= 0.83                   25 
Table 2:Results of HLM models for severity, possibility, and risk
Severity Possibility Risk
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Fixed effects:
Level 2 variables
Intercept 0.01 0.01 -0.51 -0.40 -0.20 -0.13
Mean emotional state 0.27 1.76 0.21 1.15 0.18 0.79
Gender (1= male; 0 = female) 0.08 0.30 -0.81 -2.47 -0.94 -2.27
Moment of day -0.31 -1.11 0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.10
Level 1 variables
Emotional state -0.03 -0.88 -0.20 -4.91 -0.16 -3.68
Private/professional -0.10 -0.82 0.07 -0.68 -0.07 -0.65
Frequency 0.07 3.24 -0.01 -0.74 0.00 0.07
Type of worst loss:
Physical damage 5.00 13.05 2.57 7.30 2.96 7.99
Psychological/social conflict 3.48 8.71 3.35 9.14 2.07 5.36
Loss of time or materials 3.24 8.28 2.52 7.00 1.62 4.28
Interactions:
Friends and family 0.22 0.92 -0.07 -0.32 0.58 2.63
Work  0.20 0.91 0.44 2.29 0.46 2.26
Sequence
Second in day -0.01 -0.07 0.11 0.96 0.18 1.57
Third in day -0.12 -0.99 -0.04 -0.34 0.09 0.74
Random effects:
Variance components
Level 2 (individuals)
Intercept   1.141 1.683 2.775
Slope (emotional state)  0.043 0.054
Level 1 (occasions)    5.487 4.298 4.621
Notes: (1) Coefficients/variance components significant at p<.001 are in bold, significant at p <.05 are underlined using   
t-tests or X
2 as appropriate.
(2) Degrees of freedom for level 2 variables and random coefficients are at least 70. For all other variables they are 
at least 2162.     26 
Table 3:  Results of HLM models for risk
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Fixed effects:
Level 2 variables
Intercept 2.88 14.04 -0.66 -3.41 0.29 1.42 0.52 2.20
Gender (1= male; 0 = female) -0.66 -2.10
Level 1 variables
Severity 0.43 26.71 0.26 11.88 0.22 10.05
Possibility 0.33 17.75 -0.05 -1.37 -0.06 -1.50
Severity*Possibility 0.06 11.07 0.06 11.12
Emotional state -0.08 -3.01
Type of worst loss:
Physical damage 0.56 5.84
Interactions:
Friends and family 0.55 3.04
Random effects:
Variance components
Level 2 (individuals) 2.96 1.72 1.65 1.61
Level 1 (occasions)    5.20 3.51 3.32 3.27
Notes: (1) Coefficients/variance components significant at p<.001 are in bold, significant at p <.05 are underlined using   
t-tests or X
2 as appropriate.
(2) Degrees of freedom for level 2 variables and random coefficients are at least 70. For all other variables they are 
at least 2166.     27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
   Table 4:     Mean risk judgments for 4th and 27th messages    
                 
                 
           Message number       
        4     27            
Judgments                  
                  
   Retrospective    13.9     20.8         
                  
   Simultaneous    27.7     31.5         
                 
    Difference     -13.8     -10.7         
                
                
   28 
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Figure 1: Fitted risk from emotional state and gender 
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Appendix A1: Coding schedule for activities 
     
Category    Definition and examples 
     
Professional activity    Activities that the participant describes as professional 
     
Basic occupation 
 
  Activities based on the professional activities of each participant. 
Examples: “look for information on the internet”, “hand in documents to register property”, “speaking on the telephone”, “combing the hair of the child I look after”, 
“preparing this afternoon’s class”, “taking boxes up to the warehouse”,  “explaining a policy to a client”. 
     
Transportation – professional    Traveling, be it walking, by public or private vehicle, and whether as driver, accompanying, or passenger. 
Examples: “driving,”I am in the train”, “traveling by metro”, “crossing the street,” “walking to work”. 
     
Pauses at working day, start/end of 
working day 
  Pauses during the workday and transitional activities between the beginning and end of the workday that the participant classifies as professional.        
Examples: “I am sitting waiting for a client to come”, “taking a coffee”, “arriving at work”, “collecting my things before leaving”. 
     
Personal activity    Activities that the participant categorizes as personal. 
     
Housework, personal time 
organization and managing funds 
  Housework (cleaning, tidying, preparing food, repairs, gardening...), managing money, home finances, and organizing time. 
Examples: “lighting butane stove”, “I am preparing the meal”, “doing the dishes”, “going over the plan for tomorrow”. 
     
Eating and drinking    Examples: “taking a coffee in the bar”, “having lunch”, “eating an apple”. 
     
Smoking    Examples: “lighting a cigarette”. 
     
Transportation – personal    Traveling, be it walking, by public or private vehicle, and whether as driver, accompanying, or passenger.   
Examples: “walking quickly to my apartment”, “going home in the train”, “driving”, “driving my scooter from work to home” 
     
Communication -- personal    Interaction, personal or otherwise, with the goal of transmitting information, ideas, feelings, etc.  
Examples: “speaking by telephone”, “speaking with my parents”, “discussing with my partner”, “speaking with a friend on the computer”. 
     
Shopping     Any activity related to shopping or acquiring goods.   
Examples: “loading supermarket bags”, “looking at things for the house in IKEA”, “trying on a pair of trousers”,  
     
Acquiring information    Activities for acquiring information or education. 
Examples: “printing a document”, “reading notes”, “reading the paper at the university”, “connected to the internet”, “looking at a car catalogue”. 
     
Entertainment, recreation, sports    Activities aimed at recreation but excluding those that imply acquiring information or education.       
Examples: “playing at football”, “looking at a football game”, “looking at TV “listening to music”, “playing the guitar”. 
     
Personal care    Activities related to active personal care whether the goal aesthetic, diagnostic, or therapeutic.   
Examples: “showering”, “shaving”, “applying humidifying cream to my hands”, “doing makeup”, “getting undressed to take a bath”, “getting dressed”. 
       30
Rest, sleep    Activities associated with resting. These include ending periods of rest. 
Examples: “sleeping”, “taking the sun”, “relaxing on the sofa”, “getting up from bed” 
     
Waiting    Waiting for a person, an object or a moment in time. Includes preparing to end work when this is classified as a personal activity.   
Examples: “waiting for my friends in the football team”, “waiting for the bus”, “getting my things together to go home.” 
     
Other    Uninterpretable responses 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A2: Coding schedule for worst consequence 
     
Category    Definition and examples 
     
None 
 
  Indicated specifically that there were none. 
     
Physical damage    Physical damage that implies a loss of health,  
Examples: “that I would cut myself with the paper”, “bite my tongue”, “burn myself”, “a heart attack”, “fall down”, “get killed in an accident”. 
     
Psychological discomfort    1. Psychological disturbances. Includes psychiatric disturbances, such as behavioral, cognitive and emotional disorders. 
Examples: “get depressed”, “stress”, “that I’ll get an anxiety attack”. 
2. Physical, psychological, or social discomfort.   
Examples: “that they are not broadcasting my favorite series”, “that my cell telephone wakes me up”, “fail in my work”, “that I lose my team”, “become bored”, 
“that I don’t understand”. 
     
Social conflicts    Deterioration or loss of relationships with others. 
Examples: “that the client gets angry”, “that the interviewee starts to shout and insult me”, “fight with somebody”, “that there was a misunderstanding”, “that we 
get angry”. 
     
Loss of time or materials    Deterioration or loss of something material or undesired changes in organizing one’s time.  
Examples: “that the printer breaks down”, “lose information”, “miss the train and arrive late”, “arrive late to class”, “that the house has been robbed”, “that the 
connection to the internet has been cut off”, “not find any parking and arrive late”. 
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Appendix B: Examples of responses 
     
Smoking    Eating and drinking 
-lung cancer 
-burn myself with a cigarette 
-burn myself 
-burn my eyelashes 
-cancer                                                                                              
-that I burn myself 
-burn myself, etc...                                                                                   
-that I get asthma 
-burn myself 
-get cancer 
-burn myself                                                                                       
-that the police come 
-that my parents learn that I smoke 
-burn my trousers 
-that my short gets burned 
  -to choke                                                                                        
-to choke or indigestion 
-to suffocate                                                                                            
-that I choke on my food 
-that I choke on a potato 
-to choke 
-that I don’t feel well 
-have a stomach cramp 
-that the food does not agree with me 
-to choke                                                                                        
-that I eat somthing bad and get poisoned 
-that something I eat makes me feel ill and I get   
indigestion 
-get acid in my stomach 
-burn myself       
     
 
                                                                    
 
 
    
 
 